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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, the United Nations reported that by 2025, freshwater 
shortages will affect almost half of the world’s population.1 In fact, the 
western United States is already feeling the effects of water shortages 
on the region’s environment and economy.2 In 1950, Montana, 
Wyoming, and North Dakota attempted to avoid the adverse impact 
of water shortages by entering into an interstate compact that 
governed their shared access to the Yellowstone River.3 The 
Yellowstone River Compact’s (Compact) preamble expressly stated 
that its goal is to “remove all causes of present and future controversy 
between said States . . . with respect to the waters of the Yellowstone 
River and its tributaries.”4 
After almost sixty years of relative quiet among the Compact’s 
signatories, the States find themselves litigating the permissibility of 
improved irrigation techniques that adversely affect other water 
users.5 In Montana v. Wyoming,6 the Supreme Court will address 
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 1. United Nations, Global Challenge, Global Opportunity: Trends in Sustainable 
Development 11 (Johannesburg Summit 2002), available at http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/ 
documents/summit_docs/criticaltrends_1408.pdf. 
 2. See David S. Brookshire et al., Western Urban Water Demand, 42 NAT. RES. J. 873, 
873–75 (2002) (noting increased water demand on already limited supplies and its distributional 
consequences in the West); Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species 
in the West, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (2001) (discussing the inevitable conflict between 
increased human demands on water and declining aquatic populations). 
 3. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951). 
 4. Id. pmbl. 
 5. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception at 3–4, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. 
May 13, 2010). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011  6:25:07 PM 
2011] A DEAL IS A DEAL IN THE WEST: OR IS IT? MONTANA V. WYOMING 161 
whether the upstream state, Wyoming, violated the Compact by using 
more efficient irrigation methods that consume more water and leave 
less to flow to users downstream in Montana. The Court agreed to 
hear the case pursuant to its original jurisdiction.7 As Chief Justice 
John Roberts articulated in a recent interstate water rights case, 
“[o]ur original jurisdiction over actions between States is concerned 
with disputes so serious that they would be grounds for war if the 
States were truly sovereign. A dispute between States over rights to 
water fits that bill . . . .”8 
II. FACTS 
The Yellowstone River Basin is an approximately 70,100-square-
mile watershed encompassing parts of Montana, Wyoming, and North 
Dakota.9 The main stream of the Basin rises in Yellowstone National 
Park and flows north out of Wyoming and into Montana.10 Each of the 
four main tributaries flows through Montana and Wyoming and joins 
the Yellowstone River in Montana.11 The waters of these tributaries 
are used primarily for irrigation.12 
On December 8, 1950, Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota 
entered into the Compact, which provided for an equitable division 
and apportionment of the Yellowstone River’s water supply and its 
tributaries among the States.13 The key provision of the Compact, 
Article V, governs the appropriation and allocation of water among 
the States, differentiating between pre- and post-1950 water users and 
their respective rights under the Compact.14 Article V(A), which 
governs pre-1950 rights and is the operative section for the dispute at 
issue, states that pre-1950 users possess appropriative rights to the 
 
 6. Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2011). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“[T]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . . .”). 
 8. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 876 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
 9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. 
Jan. 2, 2008). North Dakota is named as a party to the case because it was a signatory to the 
Compact, but is not taking part in the dispute. Montana’s Bill of Complaint at 3, Montana v. 
Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2007). 
 10. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 2. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 3 (the States artificially apply water to the soil to assist in the growth of 
agricultural crops, especially during arid periods). 
 13. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951). 
 14. Id. art. V. 
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beneficial uses of the river water.15 Article V(B) governs “unused and 
appropriated waters” as of January 1, 1950 and provides a quantitative 
calculation for purposes of allocating water based on post-1950 uses.16 
At the time the Compact was adopted, the main method of 
irrigation involved flooding crop fields. This method resulted in a 
majority of the water soaking into the irrigated land or evaporating. 
This process left about a third of the appropriated water to flow back 
into the source rivers, where the water originated.17 Now, more 
efficient methods of irrigation allow ten percent or less of the 
appropriated water to flow back into the tributaries and to 
downstream users.18 In effect, users in Wyoming divert the same 
amount of water they diverted when the Compact originated in 1950, 
but now they use more of it, leaving less to flow to downstream users 
in Montana. 
Montana asserts that the new efficient irrigation techniques 
adopted by Wyoming violate its pre-1950 rights under the Compact.19 
Montana filed other complaints against Wyoming contending that its 
post-1950 uses also reduce water flow and thus infringe on Montana’s 
rights under the Compact.20 The Court did not grant certiorari with 
respect to the post-1950 claims.21 
This case began in January 2007 when Montana filed a motion for 
leave to file a bill of complaint with the Supreme Court.22 A year later, 
the Court granted leave to Montana to file its complaint and 
simultaneously allowed Wyoming to file a motion to dismiss.23 In its 
motion to dismiss, Wyoming argued that the Compact did not impose 
consumption limits for pre-1950 water uses as alleged by Montana.24 
The Court appointed a Special Master—as it often does in original 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Montana’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶ 8. 
 20. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Montana’s other three theories of compact breach involve alleged 
interference with Montana’s pre-1950 rights through use of new storage reservoirs, irrigation of 
new acreage, and reductions of water caused by groundwater pumping in Wyoming. Id. 
 21. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 497 (2010). A Special Master was assigned by the 
Court to resolve post-1950 claims. Id. 
 22. Montana’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 9. 
 23. Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S. 1175 (2008). 
 24. Wyoming’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 19–20, 
Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2007). 
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jurisdiction cases—to resolve the motion to dismiss.25 The Special 
Master concluded that Wyoming’s motion to dismiss should be 
denied.26 He agreed that the Compact “unambiguously protects pre-
1950 appropriative rights” from post-1950 uses,27 but rejected 
Montana’s argument that the Compact prohibits pre-1950 
appropriators from conserving water through the adoption of 
improved irrigation techniques.28 The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this 
case derives from the Compact Clause of the Constitution.29 Under 
the Compact Clause, jurisdiction “extends to a suit by one State to 
enforce its compact with another State or to declare rights under a 
compact.”30 The Court agreed to hear arguments on the sole issue of 
whether Wyoming’s improved irrigation techniques violated 
Montana’s pre-1950 users’ water rights.31 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court recognizes three methods of allocating water 
among the states: (1) a suit in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court; (2) an act of Congress; and (3) an interstate compact.32 
Interstate compacts have been the major mechanism for defining 
states’ rights to divert and use water that crosses or comprises their 
borders.33 There are currently twenty-three interstate water 
compacts,34 in contrast to only two congressional allocations35 and 
three Supreme Court decrees.36 
A compact is an interstate agreement that has been approved by 
Congress and is both a contract between the States and a federal 
statute.37 For the purposes of interpreting such a compact, the text is 
 
 25. Montana v. Wyoming, 129 S. Ct. 480 (2008). 
 26. First Interim Report of the Special Master at 15, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. 
Feb. 10, 2009). 
 27. Id. at 37. 
 28. Id. at 86–87. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 30. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 551, 567 (1983) (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 
U.S. 290, 317–19 (1907)). 
 31. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 497, No. 137 (2010). 
 32. John B. Draper & Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Gunboats on the Colorado: Interstate Water 
Controversies, Past and Present, 55 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, § 18.03 (2009). 
 33. 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 
2010). 
 34. Id. § 46.01. 
 35. Id. § 47.01(b). 
 36. Id. § 45.07(a). 
 37. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011  6:25:07 PM 
164 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 6:160 
conclusive if unambiguous.38 Otherwise, “it is appropriate to look to 
extrinsic evidence of the negotiation history of the Compact . . . .”39 
The prior appropriation doctrine referenced in the Compact 
dictates that water uses that are “prior in time are also prior in 
right.”40 The Supreme Court has explained that, “[t]he cardinal rule of 
the doctrine [of prior appropriation] is that priority of appropriation 
gives superiority of right.”41 Under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation, a person acquires a right by diverting the water and 
putting it to a beneficial use. The lack of beneficial use of all or part of 
a water right may result in forfeiture of that right.42 If the entire 
amount diverted from the waterway is “beneficially used”—put to 
valuable use and not wasted—then that entire amount becomes the 
measure of the appropriative right.43 
Historically, the prior-appropriation doctrine protected 
downstream appropriators, like Montana, from changes in upstream 
water uses that resulted in a reduced return flow.44 It is a “well-
established” principle that “junior appropriators have vested rights in 
the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of 
their respective appropriations” and therefore can complain of 
changes in water use that “adversely affect[] their rights.”45 Both 
Wyoming and Montana have “no injury” statutes that prohibit 
appropriators from changing the purpose or place of their water use.46 
“No injury” statutes protect against formal changes in water rights. 
The presence of “no injury” statutes is not controlling in this case 
because Montana is not alleging that Wyoming appropriators have 
 
 38. See Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 690 (1995) (noting that “unless the compact to 
which Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief 
inconsistent with it express terms”) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)). 
 39. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5. 
 40. See SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 299, at 307 (3d ed. 
1911) (the date of appropriation determines the appropriator’s priority to use the water, with 
the earlier user having the superior right). 
 41. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922). 
 42. See WIEL, supra note 40, at 504 (3d ed. 1911) (“An excessive diversion of water for any 
purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for a beneficial use.”). 
 43. See id. at 502 (stating that an appropriator is entitled to the quantity of water actually 
diverted and used for a beneficial purpose). 
 44. Report of the Special Master, supra note 26, at 66. 
 45. Farmer’s Highline Canal v. Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 631–32 (Colo. 1954) (citations 
omitted). 
 46. WYO. STAT. ANN. §41-3-104; MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402. Report of the Special 
Master, supra note 26, at 67 (exceptions to this “no-injury” rule have been introduced where 
states concluded that the benefits of permitting a change outweigh the cost to downstream water 
users). 
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changed any formal water right like the place of use or type of use.47 
Both Montana and Wyoming follow the prior appropriation 
doctrine in allocating both surface water and groundwater, as do most 
western states.48 It is unclear under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation, however, whether and to what extent an appropriator 
can increase its consumption to the detriment of a downstream 
appropriator.49 Montana observes that it is “not aware of a single case 
in any jurisdiction in which a court allowed a senior appropriator to 
increase efficiency and thereby decrease historic return flows to a 
fully appropriated natural watercourse.”50 Neither party, however, 
cited a case to the contrary.51 No court in any jurisdiction, has 
adjudicated a case where—”(1) an agricultural appropriator, (2) 
increases his or her consumption of water, (3) on the same irrigated 
acreage to which the appropriative right attaches, (4) to the detriment 
of downstream appropriators, (5) in the same water system from 
which the water was originally withdrawn.”52 Since sprinkler 
irrigation, like the kind used by Wyoming, was in its infancy when the 
Compact was signed in 1950, there have been no cases decided on 
whether an irrigator could limit a downstream user’s water right by 
adopting higher-efficiency sprinkler irrigation.53 
There are, however, a few cases in both Montana and Wyoming 
that deal with an appropriator’s right to reduce water waste. Under 
Wyoming law, “[n]o appropriator can compel any other appropriator 
to continue the waste of water which benefits the former.”54 Although 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming has only decided cases on the rights 
to “seepage or waste water,” it has consistently taken an expansive 
view of these rights and held that appropriators have a right to reduce 
water waste even to the detriment of downstream users who have 
 
 47. See Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 15 (arguing that Wyoming is increasing 
water consumption of the same acreage and for the same use as before). 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. See Frank J. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 469 
(1960) (“Perhaps no area of the doctrine of prior appropriation is so confused as is the law 
pertaining to seepage or return flows.”). 
 50. Montana’s Letter Brief re Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Dismiss at 8, Montana 
v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. July 17, 2009). 
 51. Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 66. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Wyoming’s Reply to Montana’s Exception at 35, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. 
June 15, 2010). 
 54. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (Wyo. 1957). 
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become reliant on the runoff.55 Historically, Montana law has held that 
appropriators cannot change the type of water use if it modifies 
return flow to the detriment of downstream users.56 This law is not 
dispositive because it refers to a change in water use, which is not 
alleged in this case. Wyoming originally used water to irrigate and its 
use remains unchanged.57 Montana law is thus inconclusive on the key 
issue of whether an appropriator may consume more of the water 
initially diverted by switching from flood to sprinkler irrigation 
systems.58 
IV. HOLDING 
The Special Master concluded that the Compact “unambiguously 
protects pre-1950 appropriative rights in Montana from new 
diversions and withdrawals in Wyoming subsequent to January 1, 
1950.”59 But, the Special Master also found that the Compact does not 
exclude increased efficiency gains from the scope of pre-1950 rights.60 
He rationalized that any such requirement would “almost certainly 
lead to additional regulation of Wyoming’s pre-1950 appropriators.”61 
And that, the Special Master found, would read an additional 
requirement into the Compact that is not there.62 
The Special Master determined that Article V(A), which allocates 
post-1950 uses of water, “establishes only the amount of water that 
can be diverted, not consumed, by pre-1950 uses in Wyoming.”63 His 
reading of the Compact’s definition of “beneficial use” mirrored the 
commonly understood meaning of the term in western water law—it 
permits any use that actually depletes a waterway to be the basis for 
 
 55. See Binning v. Miller, 102 P.2d 54, 60 (Wyo. 1957) (“[T]he lower owner using such 
water merely takes his chances that the supply will be kept up; that he has no right thereto, no 
matter how long he may have used it.”); Bower, 307 P.2d at 601 (“If the senior appropriator by a 
different method of irrigation can so utilize his water that it is all consumed . . . and no waste 
water returns by seepage or percolation to the river, no other appropriator can complain.”); 
Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17, 20 (Wyo. 1980) (“[T]he owner of land upon which seepage or waste 
water rises has the right to use and reuse—capture and recapture—such waste waters for use 
only ‘upon the land for which the water forming the seepage was originally appropriated.’”). 
 56. See, e.g., Cate v. Hargrave, 680 P.2d 952, 956 (Mont. 1984) (stating that the change in 
place of use is permissible only if other users are unharmed). 
 57. Report of the Special Master, supra note 26, at 55. 
 58. Id. at 84. 
 59. Id. at 16. 
 60. Id. at 86. 
 61. Id. at 58. 
 62. Id. at 58–59. 
 63. Id. at 60. 
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an appropriative right.64 That use must involve depletion, but the 
beneficial user is not confined to the depletion itself; the beneficial 
use requirement is met even if some of the water later indirectly 
makes it back into the river system.65 Even when Wyoming’s initial 
diversions resulted in some return flow, the initial diversion for 
purposes of irrigation is a beneficial use under the law and merits 
protection. He concluded that the reference to depletion in the 
Compact refers to a settled principle of western water law that to 
acquire a property right to use water, the appropriator must remove 
that water from the stream.66 
Ultimately, the Special Master noted that allowing Wyoming to 
retain the benefits of its improved efficiency is reasonable because “it 
encourages increased conservation” by creating “an incentive . . . to 
invest in improved irrigation techniques.”67 The Special Master 
concluded that the significance of this decision is “inherently limited,” 
because it applies to a very particular set of facts; efficiency gains that 
are realized and used on the same lands that were being irrigated as 
of 1950—not for new lands or new purposes.68 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Montana’s Arguments 
Montana’s arguments rest on the basic proposition that the 
Compact is a water allocation agreement under which Montana is 
guaranteed enough water to meet its pre-1950 demands, and it is up to 
Wyoming to deliver that minimum amount of water to Montana.69 
Montana does not argue that the increased efficiency–irrigation 
practices are a violation of the Compact per se, rather it argues that 
Wyoming violates the Compact by diminishing the water flow 
 
 64. See id. at 61(noting that traditional prior appropriation law requires that appropriators 
actually divert water from a stream for consumptive use); BECK & KELLEY, supra note 33, § 
12.02(c)(1). 
 65. See Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 60 (“So long as the as the water 
diverted is put to a valuable use and not wasted (i.e., is ‘beneficially used’), the entire amount 
diverted is the measure of the appropriative right.”). 
 66. Id. at 61. See BECK & KELLEY, supra note 33, § 12.02(c)(1) (stating that a water right is 
contingent on diversion from a waterway in many western jurisdictions). 
 67. Id. at 87. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 11. 
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necessary to maintain Montana’s pre-1950 claims.70 This violation in 
turn has caused, and will continue to cause, direct and irreparable 
injury to Montana.71 Wyoming must ensure its increased consumption 
does not limit the return flow needed to satisfy its pre-1950 uses.72 
Because Montana’s pre-1950 rights depend on the return flow, 
Wyoming’s increased consumption, resulting from increased water 
efficiency techniques, violates Article V of the Compact, which 
governs water allocation among the signatories.73 
Montana claims that the Compact dictates that its pre-1950 uses 
are protected from increases in Wyoming’s consumption, not just 
increases in diversion. Montana relies on the Compact’s use of the 
term “depleted” in its definition of “beneficial use.”74 The Compact’s 
plain language protects pre-1950 “beneficial uses,” which are defined 
in terms of depletion of the water supply.75 The Special Master erred 
in interpreting “beneficial use” to require an actual diversion of water, 
rather than relying on the definition provided.76 Montana 
distinguishes between “diversion” and “depletion” by equating the 
latter to consumption that diminished the “return flow upon which 
Montanans rely.”77 
Alternatively, Montana contends that, even if the Compact is 
ambiguous and requires interpretation, the drafters’ intent was for the 
Compact to create a permanent allocation of water, thereby 
precluding increased consumption beyond levels set by any party in 
1950. The 1950 Senate Report accompanying the Compact establishes 
that “a demand of one State upon another for a supply different from 
that now obtaining under present conditions of supply and diversion, 
is not contemplated, nor would such a demand have legal standing.”78 
Montana also urges the Court to ignore reference to prior 
appropriation in the Compact, because the law of prior appropriation 
 
 70. Montana’s Letter Brief, supra note 50, at 12–13. 
 71. Montana’s Bill of Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 14–15. 
 72. Montana’s Letter Brief, supra note 50, at 12–13. 
 73. Montana’s Brief in Response to Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss Bill of Complaint at 47, 
Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. May 1, 2008). 
 74. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 11. 
 75. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, art. II (H) (“The term 
‘Beneficial Use’ is herein defined to be that use by which the water supply of a drainage basin is 
depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man.”). 
 76. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 25–26. 
 77. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. January 10, 
2011). 
 78. S. REP. No. 883, at 2 (1951). 
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as described by the Special Master is inconclusive as it relates to 
adoption of efficient irrigation techniques, and therefore the 
allocation set forth in the Compact should govern.79 The Special 
Master’s allowance of increased consumption on pre-Compact 
irrigated lands in Wyoming amounts to a transfer of crop production 
from Montana to Wyoming, in effect undoing the negotiated 
apportionment among the States.80 
B. Wyoming’s Arguments 
Wyoming argues that Article V(A) of the Compact does not 
guarantee any specific volume of water to flow downstream to 
Montana.81 Rather, Article V(A) incorporates the doctrine of prior 
appropriation and the “beneficial use” requirement refers to the types 
of uses rather than the amount of water used.82 Therefore, Wyoming 
irrigators with pre-1950 rights may increase their water usage by 
employing more efficient irrigation methods because the type of 
use—irrigation—remains beneficial.83 Wyoming’s reading of the 
Compact comports with prior appropriation law, where “depleted” 
means only what has been withdrawn.84 This interpretation mirrors 
both the Special Master’s findings and the way western states have 
defined beneficial uses.85 
Wyoming also points to the Compact’s structure as evidence that 
water allocation for pre-1950 users is to be governed by the doctrine 
of prior appropriation and not by a permanent allocation. The tiered 
approach of allocation in the Compact explicitly differentiates 
between the treatment of pre-1950 water rights and the treatment of 
water rights that would be created by new diversions and storage 
projects in each state after 1950. The post-1950 rights were subject to 
the cumulative divertible-flow methodology of Sections (B) and (C) 
of Article V, which provide quantitative calculations for determining 
allocation.86 
 
 
 79. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5 at 32–33 (relying on Hinderlider 
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)). 
 80. Id. at 16. 
 81. Wyoming’s Reply Brief, supra note 53, at 5. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 22 (Wyoming equates “withdrawal” with “beneficial use.”). 
 85. Id. at 13. 
 86. Id. at 11. 
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The Compact established that “Montana and Wyoming will 
interact as dictated by the various rules of the doctrine of 
appropriation” and did not create “any hard and fast amount of water 
to which [appropriative] rights will be either entitled or limited.”87 
Wyoming argues that prior appropriation rights are defined in terms 
of “depletion” in the Compact in order to prevent States from 
acquiring rights to non-depletive uses, such as mill use on a river.88 As 
the Solicitor General elaborated during oral arguments, the drafters 
chose to use the word “depletion” rather than “diversion” because 
depletion is a “criterion for beneficial use,”89 not because depletion 
equates with consumption.90 Had the drafters intended that beneficial 
use be limited to consumption, they would have expressed their 
intention in clear and express terms.91 Other compacts that impose 
quantitative limits like that which Montana proposes contain express 
provisions to that effect.92 
C. United States’ Argument 
The United States has considerable interest in this case because it 
administers water projects throughout the Yellowstone River Basin 
that may be affected by the Court’s construction of the Compact.93 
Both because of the United States’ role as administrator of water 
projects in the Basin and because compacts possess the status of 
federal law once approved by Congress, the Court invited the United 
States to participate.94 The Solicitor General of the United States 
sided with Wyoming and stated that increased efficiency irrigation 
techniques by Wyoming do not constitute a violation of the 
Compact.95 The Solicitor General’s main argument is that the 
Compact is governed by the background principle of prior 
appropriation, which is concerned with the amount of water diverted 
for beneficial use, not the amount of water consumed.96 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 21 (such a use would divert, but not consume, water). 
 89. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 50. 
 90. Id. at 50–51. 
 91. Wyoming’s Reply Brief, supra note 53, at 22. 
 92. See, e.g., Republican River Basin Compact art. III, 57 Stat. 86 (1943) (providing for the 
allocation of water based as a percentage of an annual computed water supply). 
 93. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at 
29, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137 (U.S. May 1, 2008). 
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VI. DISPOSITION 
The Court must determine what the correct meaning of 
“beneficial use” is in the Compact. Montana argues that it refers to 
the net use of water97— the amount of water diverted subtracted by 
the amount of water returned to the river. Wyoming and the U.S. 
argue that it refers to “a calculation of what is taken without 
reference to what returns.”98 
The Special Master concluded that, according to the doctrine of 
prior appropriation, the Compact does not prohibit Wyoming from 
increasing its consumption by adopting improved irrigation methods.99 
His interpretation of the doctrine comports with Wyoming law100 and 
does not contradict Montana law’s version of the doctrine, which is 
itself conflicted.101 Though this case may be of limited applicability 
because the Compact is somewhat unusual in its allocation of water, it 
is unlikely that the Court would want to reach a decision that would 
discourage more efficient water practices in the increasingly arid 
West.102 
During oral arguments, the Court primarily focused on 
deciphering the meaning of “beneficial use” in the Compact.103 The 
Justices, with the exception of Justice Scalia, appeared wholly 
unconvinced that “depletion” is the same as “consumption,” given the 
history of prior appropriation law.104 Justice Scalia refused to accept 
Wyoming’s argument that depletion is the same as diversion because 
 
 97. Brief in Support of Montana’s Exception, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
 98. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 33. 
 99. Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 90. 
 100. See note 55 and accompanying text (Wyoming law permits water users to curb runoff 
even when downstream users have become reliant on the runoff.). 
 101. See e.g., Cate v. Hargrave, 680 P.2d 952, 956 (Mont. 1984) (holding that appropriators 
cannot change their place or type of use if it would detrimentally affect downstream users); but 
see e.g., Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Mont. 1933) (holding that 
an appropriator may collect or recapture runoff “before it leaves his possession, but, after it gets 
beyond his control it thus becomes waste and is subject to the appropriation of another”) 
(emphasis added). 
 102. See id. at 37 (Unlike many other interstate water compacts, Article V(A) of the 
Yellowstone River Compact does not establish an allocation based on a quantity of water.). 
 103. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77. 
 104. Compare id. at 9 (Chief Justice Roberts: “[T]he way water law worked in the West . . . 
is you have the right to take out however much you were taking out, and the fact that less comes 
back, that’s something different. That doesn’t affect your appropriation.”) with id. at 28 (Justice 
Scalia: “[W]hat is guaranteed is not the diversion right that existed pre-1950, but the beneficial 
use right, which is the net use of the water—not the total amount diverted.”). Justice Kagan 
took no part in deciding this case. 
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he did not understand why the drafters would choose to use the term 
“depletion” rather than “diversion,” if that was what they meant.105 
The prevailing attitude among the Justices, however, was much more 
receptive to Wyoming’s analysis. Wyoming’s analysis neatly comports 
with the fundamentals of western water law; it is the straightforward 
understanding that water users have a right to take out however much 
they were taking out at the time of the appropriation, and the fact 
that less returns does not affect the users’ appropriation. Because this 
argument falls squarely in line with the Justices’ view of western 
water law, Wyoming likely will win this case. 
Furthermore, Montana’s position proved particularly 
unpersuasive to the Justices due to the practical constraints it would 
impose. During oral arguments, both Justice Breyer and Sotomayor 
seemed particularly troubled with the consequences of applying a 
consumption metric—i.e. one that calculates the water right based on 
how much water was actually consumed, rather than diverted—to 
appropriative rights.106 By adopting consumption as the metric, states 
would have to monitor and require reporting of any change in crop or 
method of irrigation because such a change would cause a difference 
in return flow.107 It is unlikely the Compact intended to impose such 
requirements, as the Compact itself states that its “provisions are 
easily administered, and require no elaborate organization.”108 
Additionally, equating “beneficial use” with the amount of water 
consumed would require actual knowledge of how much each 
individual irrigator returns to the river in Wyoming.109 Even Wyoming 
acknowledged that there is no way of knowing whether each 
individual irrigator could measure how much he returned to the 
River.110 
Justice Breyer asked the Solicitor General whether there was a 
“fair way to decide this case?”111 The Solicitor General responded that 
the fairest way to resolve the dispute between Montana and Wyoming 
is by enforcing what the States signed up for.112 According to the text 
of the Compact, the history of prior appropriation and the current 
 
 105. Id. at 28. 
 106. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77 at 7, 10–11. 
 107. Report of Special Master, supra note 26, at 87–88. 
 108. S. REP., supra note 78, at 1. 
 109. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 11. 
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. Id. at 43. 
 112. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011  6:25:07 PM 
2011] A DEAL IS A DEAL IN THE WEST: OR IS IT? MONTANA V. WYOMING 173 
trend of protecting appropriators who limit waste, the Supreme Court 
likely will return to the central dogma of western water law—”prior 
in time, prior in right,”113 and find that Wyoming is entitled to the 
amount of water that it has diverted since 1950, without any regard to 
what flows back. 
 
 
 113. WIEL, supra note 40, at 307. 
